1: Cohen E-4,5 (1956-1965) 1967 MS14 Kanuri MS14

241 cattle have not broken into and eaten the produce, very little work is required in
221 cultivating crops. Thus work on crop production is concentrated into less than six months leaving the rest of the year free for other activities.

241 Although almost all Kanuri households obtain some food and some cash
433 from their farm plots, the amount of farming varies from person to person, from
434 village to village, and even for the same person from season to season. In the city,
592 many people have dropped farming and manage to earn enough cash income to furnish their needs from the market. In the villages some households, usually in areas of good soil and water supply, produce agricultural surpluses, while in other areas the farm work provides only part of the household needs. Again some farmers tend to produce fairly similar amounts of grain crops per year while others fluctuate, so that they produce practically nothing some years and large bounties a few years later. Increased prices of ground-nuts and guinea corn stimulate greater household farming activities while trade and other nonfarming activities may interfere with a man's farming. Sickness in the compound as well as blight and soil depletion tend to decrease agricultural proceeds, and finally in the rural areas increase or decrease in household size, especially in the number of wives, all tend to affect the fluctuation of crop proceeds from one household to another or within the same household over time. People who report themselves to be primarily farmers produce more than those who report themselves to be craftsmen, although for the Magumeri area the difference, when measured, does not seem to be very great. On the other hand, traders and political and religious specialists seem to produce approximately one quarter to one third as much on their farms as other people, and many in this category do not farm at all.

241 The importance of wives has already been noted. The number of wives
464 available to any cultivator, as well as the number of his male subordinates in the
592 household, is the major factor affecting crop production. The high divorce rate
593 makes this primary source of labor somewhat unpredictable for each farmer. On
[433] the other hand it also helps to stabilize marriage. Thus the more men depend upon help from their wives the less likely they are to divorce them, although their efforts in this direction are never completely successful and the insecurity of farm help is always there. The insecurity can be alleviated by using sons or clients or laborers,
[476] all of whom require payment in some way for their help. All rural Kanuri at times help their neighbors, their relatives, or friends to farm and often a group of such men get together to help one another in a cooperative work gang and then reciprocate by helping each other in turn. Thus although many Kanuri do move around in
241 Bornu, farming favors the most stable who can build up social relations in one
571 place that can be utilized in the form of labor to offset the possible insecurity caused by the ever-present high divorce rate.

241 To make the situation more complicated many Kanuri are not rooted in the
57 land emotionally. It is part of both the traditional and contemporary Kanuri con-
183 ception of getting ahead in the world that personal advancement is not to be found
[557] in farming. Achievement in Bornu is seen as stemming out of profitable social rela-
[197] tionships and more recently western schooling. If it is judged to be personally
[871] profitable for an individual to leave his farm work in order to become someone's client, there is little hesitation. Men asked me to take them on as clients and give
[123] them some money for trading purposes. They offered to travel anywhere in Bornu

1: Cohen E-4,5 (1956-1965) 1967 MS14 Kanuri MS14

areas. Their goals are almost universally to obtain more qualifications and to advance in the civil service to higher paid jobs with more authority and prestige.

Recruitment into the departments can be carried out in a variety of ways. An application can be sent to the Native Authority Council or the relevant departments in writing. People seem to think this is not an effective way of obtaining a position, and it is rarely practiced. Another way is to obtain new recruits from among the school graduates of the secondary schools. This is becoming more and more common as time goes on, however it is a highly impersonal technique and thus not attractive to many in the community who still feel that they must have some private, personal relationship with their superiors-to-be before they can obtain any rewards for themselves. Thus it is widely believed that such personal relationships are the primary requisite to enlistment in the civil service, given that the educational qualifications are satisfactory. Thus one young man working in the Native Authority civil service explained it this way:

> If you want a job in the . . . department, one of your relatives should find the name of a person in the department who is known to help people. Your relative then goes to greet him in the evening and gives him some money and perhaps other gifts. The man who can help then tells your relative to come back at such and such a time and he will let him know the result. Then he will try to find a job in the department, probably by using some of the money your relative gave him. Then the job is yours and you are an employee of the Native Authority . . . sometimes it takes a long time.

Certainly young boys with higher educational qualifications have less difficulty obtaining jobs, but as the educational system increases the numbers of its graduates at upper levels, then places in the Native Authority will become less available, and so this particular method of recruitment will in all likelihood remain for some time to come.

The emirate civil service departments have two standards that employees must maintain at all costs. First, they must be competent at their job, and the leaders of the emirate are always interested in raising such levels. Job re-training schemes, and trips by senior department members to other parts of Nigeria or even overseas are becoming more and more common. Secondly, there must be loyalty and obedience to the department. This is traditional and involves the same kind of behavior we have observed in all community relationships involving superiors and subordinates, starting with the household and moving out into the society as a whole. However departments are too large for very intimate contacts and some of the impersonality of modern bureaucracy has entered to make relations somewhat unpredictable. One young man complained that in his department it is essential to dress less well than one's superior or one would be considered overly ambitious, threatening, and untrustworthy. On the other hand it is also important not to dress too poorly or people in authority would consider one a wastrel who spends his money on women, praise-singers, and drink. Again it is, according to many of the younger men, difficult to transfer from one department to another. To transfer, a formal application must be made to one's own department superiors and to the Native Authority Council; if a release is granted, then a further application to some other department can be submitted. Those reporting this procedure said it was

1: Cohen MS14 Kanuri MS14

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/For client-patron relationships (tada njima), see category 571./

584 obstacle to such a marriage is the bride-price, which will be
565 high for a daughter of a good family. The father of a boy of good family, conversely, may arrange to have his son marry the daughter of a talaka if he likes the girl, particularly if she is very pretty. A talaka will not usually arrange for the marriage of his son with the daughter of a very rich man (a wealthy trader, for example), because the girl will eventually inherit wealth and her husband will have no claim to it, nor will the
584 boy's father ever see any of it. However, a talaka father may
565 arrange for his son to marry the daughter of a kantuoma (aris-
557 tocrat) family in order for his son to benefit from his future father-in-law's influence in obtaining power, though the boy's own father will not himself directly benefit from the marriage.

581 The qualities desired in a kalə yaska spouse are as follows: a pretty girl is highly desirable in marriage; a girl with a nasty temper, one who curses people or has other undesirable personality characteristics (such as shamelessness--nungu ba) will not find a husband so easily. A pretty girl is better than a wealthy one, but better still is industriousness and willingness to work hard. Being able to cook well is also more important than beauty. If the father of a boy has two girls to choose from as brides for his son, one pretty and the other industrious and skilliful, he will prefer the industrious
584 one for his son. If a girl does not like the boy suggested for her by her father, if she thinks him ugly, the marriage will not take place. The father of the girl will ask her if she likes the

592 slaves living within the compound as part of the household may
567 be children or young girls, or they may be chirs. Murshe who
565 bear children are freed by virtue of being the mother of their
[528] master's child, though they remain murshe. Such a child inherits equally with children borne to a wife.

592 At present there are many powerful and wealthy household
556 heads who are not members of the aristocracy or royalty. These
565 men, though they do not own slaves, are important men in the larger towns, and their households reflect their wealth and
592 their social importance. Included as part of their household
597 may be children who have been given to them and are their adopted sons. Children are frequently given by their parents to individuals in other households, where they grow up. There are two types of 'giving': a child may be given to a close relative, such as to one's childless brother or to one's mother, whose children are all grown and whose house is now empty. A man blessed with many children of his own will give a child to a
592 relative. Another sort of giving involves naming the child
597 after an important man (the child's chibuna). The chibuna then
• 557 has the option of asking for the child after it is weaned, or
[553] later, so that the child will grow up in his household as his adopted son. A child growing up as part of an important man's household will have many possibilities open to him, possibilities not available to the common man. The parents make the initial choice when they name the child, indicating that they would wish their son to grow up in his chibuna's household. The

592 important man then exercises his choice by asking for the child
597 should he observe it to be bright and attractive, or neglecting
557 to ask should he for some reason not want the child. The child is usually given at the time of weaning. If the child is given to his chibuna, he does not return to visit his real parents, as there is shame (nungu) involved, though he will not call his adopted parent "my mother", or "my father." A man treats his adopted son (his chibuna--a reciprocal term) just as he would
[428] treat his own son. However, the boy does not inherit from his
[583] chibuna. The head of the household does supply his adopted son with a bride-price when he marries.

557 Many boys are named after nobles, after Lowans and Ajias.
592 Some of these chibuna are taken into the aristocratic household,
597 though a good many are not and grow up in their true father's
565 household. Certain talaka household heads have become very wealthy in the recent years, and have three or even four wives and very large households. Neighbors and acquaintances may name their sons after these men, who may then take their young chibuna into their household. It is clear, therefore, that size and composition of one's household is related to the old system of social stratification (royalty, aristocracy, talaka, slaves), since slaves are part of the household of both royalty and aris-
[178] tocracy. It is also related to the rise of new classes of people, as a result of changing economic and political conditions, and this can be seen in the giving of children to household heads who are themselves talaka, but have become powerful and wealthy.

553 other as chuwuna and refer and act towards one another in a similar
571 fashion to that of grandparents and grandchildren. For parents this becomes an avenue for showing affection to a collateral relative or a close friend in much the same way as we appoint our own children's
553 god-parents. This naming custom is also a means of establishing
557 profitable relations both for the parents (especially the father) and for the child. Consequently, in the Kanuri state there are a great many children called after District Heads, aristocrats of the state, rich men, and people in high status positions generally. The previous chief of Magumeri District had been a particularly beneficent and popular political leader of the area. When he departed to take up residence in another District he left in his wake a large number of children who had been named after him. The reason for giving names in this way is not only to flatter or honour the person
[597] involved. There is a very conscious awareness that the namesake relation includes the possibility of adoption as frequently occurs in the case of the grandparent-grandchild relation. Thus there is in this extension outwards and often upwards of the chuwuna relation an attempt to better or at least increase the social relations of the family and especially, it is hoped, of the child.

607 There is a joking relationship between ego and his spouse's younger siblings, real and classificatory, of either sex.
[601] Informants are emphatic in denying that it is possible even in joking
[582] to call Wi-Yo-Sis "wife" or "little wife" as do the Hausa.(1) Marriage with Wi-Yo-Sis is taboo unless the present wife is dead. Informants

(1) Smith, M.G., op. cit. p. 43

593 596 571 complete autonomy even when his new residence pattern has been established. On the other hand, the father is only a lower link in 593 a large, complex political system, and the father's relationships to 557 those above him are carefully scanned by the son. If the father should fall out of favour in the total political organization of Bornu, then to that extent his degree of power over his son may diminish, for the son being desirous of eventually stepping into the father's shoes is also sensitive to higher authorities than those of his immediate residential grouping. The continued loyalty and subservience of the son is therefore a function of the father's beneficence and his total position in the society at large. Certainly the bonds of consanguinity enter to thicken the tie between them, but a continued violation of the above methods of making the relationship work, i.e. validating the relationship, would lead to the possibility of the son looking for a more beneficent superior, real father notwithstanding. The father-son relationship would then have more formal bèrsum (respect) than actual functioning power and authority involved. Because of the ascribed nature of the real father role, however, the relationship can never be totally divested of authority. He can always secure some little performance of action on the part of the son, which the culture sanctions, such as attendance at family weddings, funerals, etc. although his power, i.e. his ability to make decisions about action for his son's behaviour is more highly variable and requires more careful cultivation if it is to be as diffuse as is ideally desired in the patrilocal family organization.

571 557 If the foregoing description seems too mechanistic, it is a result of the example chosen to illustrate the phenomena. In this

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557 case the factors are easily isolated and can be held up to view because of the manipulation of the power and authority ingredients of the relationship by the people involved and the prominent part they play in the continuity of the interaction. In the give and take of ordinary day to day life, however, the thresholds of decision-making vary tremendously from person to person. Some complain continually of their present set of relationships but never seem to change; others complain and are also highly motivated to obtain more profitable ties, while others who seem content suddenly inform their friends that they are leaving their present set of arrangements because they can link up more profitably elsewhere. To explain this variability would require a psychological analysis of each individual's motivation, plus a thorough knowledge of the total scale of his social relationships, since the more persons one knows and the farther they are spread out over the society as a whole, the easier it is to shift from one set of relationships to another. Persons who have remained in one locality all their lives naturally tend as they grow older to become more identified with the particularities of the area. Their scale of relationships is restricted spatially and thus the range of profitable possibilities for changing social relations is [554] narrowed. Again as a general rule, biologically ascribed relationships of a kinship or non-kinship (i.e. slavery) variety tend to be more durable than achieved ones, in Bornu as in all societies.

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621 In another residence grouping, a man was observed to have obtained a good deal of power and authority over quite a large group of adjacent semi-independent compound units. These included the man's own compound, containing his two wives, the next compound

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592 which housed his married son and wife and their child, and his other
621 son who was a full brother to the first. Across from his son's compound was that of his full younger sibling and wife (no children) and next to that of his full younger sibling was the compound of his patrilateral parallel male cousin who is married and has two children. All these groupings are semi-separate compounds, but have openings in the straw mat walls from one into the other. They are all semi-independent economic units, having their own farms and dry season activity, which for all of them, except the senior man in question, [426] is calabash carving and marketing. The senior man is a money-lender [651] and has comparatively large farm holdings. He collects the tax from all the household units enumerated above and remits it to the Village 556 Head. The rest of the males involved plant, hoe and sow his farms, 621 and go on messages to collect loans, or sell something for him. He, 571 in turn, helps them financially when necessary, gives them gifts and [577] represents them before the higher community authorities. They, in their turn, often manifest some rebelliousness towards the senior's power but at the same time are the only people who ever openly defended the morally degrading activity of money-lending, which keeps their superior in his economically powerful position. The economic and social security which they gain by maintaining this extended household organization outweighs for them the shame of being attached to a money lender's household, as well as the annoyance in every day life of subservience to his power and authority.

• 557 Thus, the manipulation of the ingredients of power and
571 authority are major determinants of local groupings of people into operating social units, although they are imbedded in a discernible

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range of personal ambition, inertia, and variation in the scale of social relations. The kinds of structures which result from the natural processes of birth, maturation, marriage and death may vary and, as we have seen, result in various kinds of stresses to be incorporated into the organization. However, these can almost always be mitigated when the structure has a satisfactory operating distribution of power and authority. If not, then fissionable forces in residence structures tend to emerge and themselves determine the character of the group.

Maximal Lineages and Clans

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It is not necessary within the scope of the present discussion to go into a full description. Nevertheless, it should be noted that traditionally Kanuri kinship included functional clans and to some extent at least, i.e. among the upper classes, maximal patri-lineages. In Chapter II, mention was made of the military use of clans in the army in the pre-1893 periods of Bornu history. All Kanuri if pressed are able to give their clan membership whose identity they generally recognize patrilineally. Exceptions were found, however, where informants gave two clans which they identified as coming to them from their mother and their father. Nevertheless, basing judgment upon the statements of older informants it seems fairly certain that clan membership was reckoned patrilineally.

The Magumi and Kubûri clans are recognized by some to be the clans of the leading lineages of the Kanuri and Kanembu peoples respectively. It is also generally known in a rather vague way, which varies from informant to informant, that all clan members are descended from a common ancestor about whom there is sometimes an

As a man and woman grow older they demand and are given progressively more independence of choice in all matters including marriage. This is more likely among the peasants. For here second marriages are not as likely to be used as mechanisms for creating, strengthening and maintaining relationship by the girl's luwali to whom it is traditional to return on the occasion of divorce. It is more likely that the upper class woman will come under the power and authority of her luwali in subsequent marriages than the lower class person who is left freer to make her own liaisons. The upper class woman although not in purda during her divorced status must be much more delicate and restrained about her movements. This necessity to maintain an appearance of probity lends itself more easily to the manipulation of the upper class woman by her luwali after her first one or two divorces than does the relative freedom of the lower class woman. Among all classes an extremely young divorcee of under fifteen is almost sure to have little freedom of choice for her second husband, although cases of such early divorce are rare.

During the harvest season (November to February) divorced women (gower) are more serious about trying to pin down one of the temporary liaisons to marriage. Men at this season are similarly inclined but tend to shop around a little before settling on one choice, unless their minds were made up before the harvest season opened. With a few exceptions (notably female) both sexes consider married status desirable and for a man, having two wives is better than having one. The exceptions to this rule are women who are either very attractive to men and thus enjoy themselves economically and sexually as unmarried women, and/or women who refuse to give up their independence for marriage. These factors are often related and as we shall see there is room for the expression of all of them within marriage. Men marry if their harvest

581 In discussing the matter
582 further, informants always point out the relative difficulty of divorce
602 in such marriages as well as the lack of personal independence. The woman's relatives, who are also ego's (male speaking), always try to patch up the differences between her and ego, and scold him for not being "good" to his little sister. On the other hand, the move towards semi-independence, signalled by marriage, is restricted by cousin marriage. In-law avoidance which draws a man to his wife, and she to him as a social unit set apart from their own descent backgrounds, is much weakened in this kind of union, which makes it more difficult for a man to express any individual independence of his kin group.

582 The next type of marriage to be considered is the nyia kam
• 557 rukatabe (marriage of pleasure). The expression means marriage to a man of wealth or high status, i.e. marriage with one of his daughters or with one of the girls over whom he has rights of marriage dispensation. The closer the girl comes to being the actual biological daughter of the wealthy and/or high ranking man, the more highly valued the marriage becomes. The term also describes marriage to a wealthy and/or high ranking woman.

One common form of this marriage occurs in the following manner. A person subservient to a powerful household head may need a wife and make this known to the household head, as he invariably does, along with all of his other requirements. The superior then give his subordinate a girl from among the marriageable girls of the household, to whom the household head stands in the relation of luwali. By so doing, the household head strengthens his ties with his subordinate by extending their relation to include father-in-law/son-in-law.(1) It will

[608] (1) Ego always behaves to his wife's luwali in the same manner as he does to his wife's biological father, whether the roles are occupied by the same person or not.

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557 be remembered that a bride's family is traditionally of higher status than a groom's. In this situation we see the perfect fit to the traditional evaluation of status between a man (and his group) and his in-
583 laws. The bridewealth is usually not excessive since the entire set of arrangements takes place within the extended household organization of one wealthy and/or high ranking man. This does not mean that the groom must live inside the superior's household, for the organization may encompass a group of households. The arrangement parallels the form of cousin marriage since two members within one organization are being married, rather than members from two separate and distinct organizations.

Another way of doing the same thing would be for the household head to find a girl from among the households of his friends or relatives and initiate the arrangements for a marriage between his subordinate and the girl in question. In this case the superior would almost certainly help the subordinate with gifts and loans of money. This kind of behaviour is very similar to that of a father obtaining a wife for his young unmarried son who lives in the father's compound. Consequently when a powerful household head arranges such a wedding for his subordinate he is acting like a father to his follower. Informants noted the similarity when they spoke of this kind of behaviour.

Where no strong relationship exists between two males a high ranking person may single out some individual, junior to himself in status, with whom he wishes to obtain a relationship and give him a fere (daughter, ward, girl), in order to create some obligation as a basis for their relations into the future. As a general rule the superior uses his powers of dispensation to maintain, create and strengthen supportive subordinates, while the subordinate invests his subservience to obtain the fruits of his superior's powers of dispensation.

3: Cohen B-4,5 (1956-1957) 1960 M514 Kanuri M514

582 For example, in 1930 the District Head of Hobber, who was in grave dan-
557 ger of being dismissed from his position by the British, contracted a marriage with a daughter of the Wazir of Bornu.(1) This was his own way, the Kanuri way, of attempting to strengthen his waning political position in the State. He felt that a marriage link between himself and the household of the Wazir would make it more difficult for the higher powers to dispose of him, and would enlist the aid of the Wazir, the second most powerful man in the Kanuri political organisation, on his [648] behalf. The British administration, however, did not take into account the feelings of fathers-in-law for sons-in-law(2) when judging political performance, and so the manoeuvre was in the end to no avail.

The nyia kam rukatabe can also refer to a marriage which is initiated purely for the sake of marrying a woman or a girl, whose attachment to ego will obviously profit him economically. She is often wealthy herself, or is a wealthy heiress. Thus a high ranking person was observed to spend a great deal of money (this might almost be termed an"investment") for a virgin girl who was the only heir of a rich old man of lower social rank to himself. Informa[redacted]cribed this as a true nyia kam rukatabe (marriage with a rich man [redacted]rl).

582 By their very nature marriages of this variety are more com-
587 monly of the virgin type. However, young girls who divorce and return
557 to the households of their luwali, as tradition prescribes, very often
565 can be utilized for such marriages in their second or possibly even third unions. Since high ranking women are more often in seclusion there is a greater probability that successive dispensations after div-

(1) See above; chap. III,
(2) The official records do not give the actual biological linkage of the girl to the Wazir, and it is therefore impossible to tell what kind of a ward she was in the Wazir's household.

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565 orces can be made of them, since they more often feel compelled to return to the partial seclusion of their luwali's compound, especially during their younger years. Consequently, those in higher ranks not only command higher prices for the girls they dispense, both materially and in terms of social obligations, but get more chance to dispense the same girl, given the high divorce rate. The lower class girl very often wants much more freedom in her marriage choices after her first divorce than the high ranking woman. Thus class differences make for a higher proportion of "investment material" (i.e. dispensable women) for creating obligations where they are needed most, among the upper ranks of society. It should also be remembered that upper class households tend to be larger and thus in both absolute numerical as well as in terms of more utilization being made of the same girl, the high status individual can obtain "higher returns" (more obligations and relationships) from his rights of dispensation.

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793 Nyia sada'abe - marriage of charity or gift marriage[1] is similar in many respects to the foregoing except that the person receiving the girl or young woman (more often a virgin girl) is always a mallam (Koranic teacher-priest). Informants claim that such a marriage is considered to be a charitable act (sada'a) and confers honour upon the
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583 donor. In such cases much, if not all, of the gift giving by the male to the girl and her kin before the marriage is waived, except that in connection with the formalizing ceremony on the day of marriage. To what extent the bridewealth is excluded varies from case to case depending upon the wealth or poverty, and power of the mallam in question, and

(1) c.f. Ellison, R.E. op. cit. He calls this nyia mallambe - a marriage with a mallam. This expression was heard, although informants preferred the term used here.

582 793 583 [557] the motivations of the luwali in giving his ward. It may be that the mallam is attached to a large household organization. Then the marriage very closely resembles the previous type, except that the marriage payments to the girl's kin are reduced or waived because of the cultural definition of such a marriage as a charitable act by the wife-giver.

581 582 793 Again, a man may wish to express his gratitude to a mallam for supernatural aid in which the mallam utilized his special skills. This can result from medical aid, divination, or charms provided by the mallam. On the other hand, most individuals would be quite hesitant about refusing the request of a mallam for a girl, if such were made, because of the general awe in which he and his avowed supernatural powers are held in the public eye. For the same reason there is some anxiety connected to the giving of a girl to a mallam, for if anything should go wrong with the marriage and produce dissatisfaction on the part of the mallam, his powers of retaliation are very great.

582 793 This does not mean that mallams themselves receive all their wives through charity. One informant of about thirty years of age was a peasant mallam, who farmed and lived in Magumeri. He wrote charms for people, and officiated in a minor way at the ceremonies in his immediate ward of town. He had been married six times, almost always to one wife at a time, with the exception of about a one year period when he had two wives in his compound. Of these six marriages only one had been a nyia sada'abe (a gift marriage). He said that he preferred to obtain his wives like any other man, then he would owe no one any special obligations.

58 Nyia ardiabe (marriage by agreement) refers to marriages where the man and woman involved have a strong desire to marry one ano-

593 This is often accompanied by a
595 more rapid turnover in other wives who tend to resent the close re-
586 lationship of the longer term wife with the common husband.

4. Status of Wife's Family

593 Among marriages where the woman or girl has come from a
565 higher ranking family than the man's, the woman has a potential lever which she may use to ameliorate male dominance. She realizes that her husband's connection to her family is one of the foundations of his social status and ease of divorce makes her connecting function some-
[602] what tenuous. On the other hand, her family may be interested in maintaining their relationship with her husband, and thus attempt to limit her behaviour to a position more in line with cultural ideal of submissiveness, in order to keep her husband satisfied, as well as honouring their own positions as givers of not just wives but of "good" wives.

5. Personality Factors

593 Needless to say, the particular personality make-up of the
156 husband and wife helps determine whether or not the traditional pattern of male dominance is possible. Fearful, timid, submissive men do not make strong, dominating husbands, while independent, strong-willed women do not easily become subservient, humble and docile wives. The cultural pattern may be reacted to in different ways. It is anxiety provoking to those men who fail, or are afraid of being unable to dominate, while it may serve as an outlet for aggression and hostility on the part of disappointed men who have failed elsewhere in their lives.

6. Socio-Economic Status of the Husband

593 As was noted above, a man needs a wife to cook his food and
557 return hospitality, as well as to provide food for men who have no wives, which helps create obligatory relationships for the male. The

593 wife (non-secluded) is also a productive asset in farming activities.
557 Women are fully aware in every marriage they enter to what extent their
[558] husbands are dependent upon them for the maintenance of their socio-economic status in the community, and are fully prepared at all times to manipulate their husbands, using the threat of easy divorce to break down his traditional right of domination and assert their independence within the marriage relationship. This obtains in economically low status households where the man has some difficulty in obtaining enough capital to marry. In its extreme form, given a timid husband with one wife of low status socially and economically, and an independent woman, this variable may create a completely female dominated household. Other men tend to gossip about such marriages speaking [521] [837] of them as ridiculous jokes upon the poor, weak husband and scandalous, shameful behaviour on the part of the wife who usually includes open sexual freedom as a part of her dominant position. When questioned about such marriages, however, informants adopt a somewhat fatalistic attitude and comment that there is nothing the unfortunate man can do, since he needs a wife so badly and has not the necessary economic power [183] available to him to assert his rights. Thus the cultural pattern of male dominance must be supported by real social instruments; if the male's status is overly dependent upon his wife, it becomes almost impossible for the cultural ideal of female subordination to function 593 properly. This is why higher ranking males can expect higher accord- 565 ance with traditional standards on the part of their wives. If they 183 are successful men, then all they wish from their wives is good, proper, ethical conduct, which includes submissiveness. At this level, the married status of the woman requires that she must meet her husband's demands for wifely behaviour or he will get rid of her. The operation

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561 Conversation among peasants suddenly stops when one of these fellows approaches the group.

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692 The DH's followers are disciplined by the DH rather than the local Lawan. Peasant legal cases usually come before the Lawan for adjudication. But legal cases between peasants and DH's followers are brought to the DH or the District Alkali (Muslim judge) court. The DH disciplines his followers for any high-handed treatment of peasants because such behaviour if continued unchecked can bring action against
[681] him from higher up in the state. Thus the DH Magumeri severely and publicly reprimanded his followers for misdemeanours such as assaulting peasants or not repaying debts. One member of the DH's organisation was publicly reprimanded and privately threatened with expulsion from the organization for burning down a pagan's hut because the latter would not give up his wife to the desires of the follower.

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571 The followers of DH receive money, food, clothes and status in the society as members of a powerful organization. In return they give him the prestige afforded to anyone who has a large retinue of loyal supporters in a culture where such followings are highly valued.
[557] Informants often remark that one DH was a "bigger" man than another
634 because he had more followers. They also serve as his executive and
571 carry out his decisions in the District. Thus in Magumeri District,
661 where not many of the people are enthusiastic about western education, the DH uses his followers to abduct children from their parents in order to fill the two classrooms of the District's only school. Another DH known to the writer assesses each Lawan for the amount of taxes he must raise annually with the understanding that there will be enough left over after revenue is delivered to the capital for the DH and the Lawan to have some cash gains. In one case a Lawan of the District claimed

634 The DH as a titled sub-ruler under the Shehu still has a
647 highly respected position in the society, and the N.A. officials are
554 ready and willing to pay respect to his traditional prestige. Thus
[576] if the DH (on the rare occasions when he does emerge from his residence) passes by, N.A. officials like everyone else stand up while he moves past them; similarly as a mark of respect they remove their shoes before coming into his presence.

634 Finally, if the N.A. official is not incorporated into the
647 extended household organization of the DH, then the factional member-
662 ships of the DH as compared to that of the official also tend to determine how much pressure the DH is able to exert in the situation. If the DH is closely connected to the Department Heads, and other high ranking N.A. officials, and these latter respect his friendship and judgement, then he may have an avenue of control over the local official through the latter's own superiors. On the other hand, if the N.A. employee is himself connected to powerful factions in the state, then the DH knows that this particular person can bring powerful forces into action against him.

634 The potential conflict between the DH and the N.A. officials
647 disappears when the latter is part of the DH's extended household or-
• 557 ganization. In Magumeri, one N.A. Messenger and the N.A. prison warder were followers of the DH. The N.A. Messenger started about twenty years ago in Maiduguri as a seller of cut grass for horse feed. Later he became attached as a servant-follower to an ex-Shehu's son[1] and from there became a horsed follower (ko'una) of the present DH of Magumeri who

[838] (1) Bornu gossip attributes this rather large upward leap to a homosexual relationship between the servant and his master, which the Kanuri believe is one way for a man of no means to move up the social ladder; i.e. by making himself available sexually to a homosexual member of the upper classes.

works, etc., - are distinctly western. The Councillors work under the advice of the Provincial Government Department, i.e. the Colonial government, whose top personnel are Europeans.

The personnel in the N.A. departments form what has come to be called a new class in the society - the new mallams. They wear wrist watches, read vernacular newspapers, listen avidly to the radio, go to political meetings, join civil service associations, and think of themselves as urban, even when they are stationed in the bush. For the most part they have obtained their jobs as a result of some exposure to western education. The separateness of this "class" from the traditional society is often claimed by British officials some of whom see in this group the foundation of a new ruling elite whose membership will be based on western education and outlook. That western education is a new means of upward mobility is undeniable, but the separateness of the new mallams in the N.A. departments from their traditional society and its values is open to doubt. This point can be illustrated by looking at some of the informal rather than formal rules of behaviour operating in the N.A.

Recruitment into the N.A. can be by application to the Shehu's Council or the relevant Department, in writing. No informants in the N.A. had heard of this method ever being used. Another way of recruiting personnel is to obtain the new civil servants from among the Secondary School boys of Maiduguri. Teachers in the Secondary School remark that this method is being used more often as time goes on. However, the most often utilized method of recruitment to the N.A. is a

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power, make the final decision if they wish. Stalemates are settled by the Governor of the Northern Region. The Resident officer of Bornu was adamant in his opposition to the Kanuri's own choice for Shehu-elect in his conversations with the writer on this topic.

647 traditional one. One of the senior members of an individual's agnatic
• 557 group arranges an audience with some person connected to an N.A. department. One informant in the N.A. commented on recruitment in the following manner.

> If you want a job in the Treasury, one of your relatives (a senior male agnate) will find out, if he does not already know, the name of some person who is known to "help" people and go to greet him some night. Your relative will give him some money and he will say that you must come back the next day and he will tell you. Then he will find you a job in the Department, probably by using some of the money your relative gave him, and then the job is yours, and you are in the N.A. . . . Sometimes it takes a long time.

647 Because of the constant shifts in personnel, some to higher positions, others because of dismissals or jail terms, there is much unpredictability of job tenure in the N.A. and suspicion of unorthodox
647 behaviour is a common rule. Thus one junior N.A. official remarked
576 that he must be careful in his department to always dress less well than his superiors, or it would be considered ro kura (ambitious, proud), and therefore threatening. On the other hand, he must not dress too poorly or his superiors will consider him a wastrel, who
647 spends his money on women, praise-singers, and drink. Again, it is extremely difficult to transfer (through own effort) from one branch of the service to another. To transfer, a formal application must be made to the person's own department heads and N.A. council; if a release is granted, then a further application to the desired department
[829] can be submitted. To the Kanuri such a transfer is not considered a rejection of the work, but of the people in the department. Thus informants claimed that they would be considered ingrates and trouble-
[662] makers if they were ever to attempt such a thing. Transfers, if they are to be accomplished at all, must be done through relatives and friends "visiting at night", i.e. paying tribute to the appropriate

647 people higher up in the N.A. organization. It might also be achieved
662 by using factional membership if this membership group was powerful enough.

647 Advancement in the N.A. is a combination of education, and
[557] diplomatic skill at Kanuri interpersonal relations, plus the status of one's agnatic group in the factional segments of the state. Western education, unless it is of a University caliber, is not enough, especially when those higher up in the N.A. are often less well educated than some of the personnel lower down who have come through an expanded educational program that was not available to many of the older generation.

On the surface, the N.A. looks like a western civil service. There are offices, typewriters, clerks, officials, expense
647 vouchers, memoranda, telephones, employee organizations, etc. However,
571 within the N.A. it is soon observed that Kanuri patterns of association are still highly determinative of the methods of behaving. "Big men" in the N.A. have their large extended household organizations of followers and kinsmen, and establishment of loyalty and subservience to superiors in the N.A. itself through the granting of socio-economic rewards still operates. This is why N.A. officials stationed in the Districts are unstable elements in the District organization of the DH. Their loyalties must be towards their department organization or
[641] they may find themselves in trouble. Finally it should be understood that the idea of loyalty to an ideal of public service, rather than to particular individuals is a foreign concept that has no place in traditional Kanuri society and its norms of conduct.

Discipline in the N.A. reflects the operation of Kanuri

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593 only the upper classes can afford to maintain and enforce such a re-
[565] lationship. The remaining categories can be regrouped under two head-
ings.

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• 557 Firstly, there are marriages in which a man obtains a wife by virtue of his relationship to an extended household organization and its head. The household head uses his luwali role (and in some cases his influence over other luwali) either to strengthen or create
[582] obligatory relationships with other men. In some cases these unions take the form of cousin marriages (nyia durbe). In others, they merely emphasize already existing superior/subordinate relationships, while in still others, they serve as the initiating circumstance for an attempt
[583] at such a relationship. As we have seen, gift marriage (nyia sada'abe) in which a girl is given to a Koranic mallam also entails the mutual understanding of an obligatory, subordination by the Mallam to the luwali.

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[584] Secondly, in marriages of agreement (nyia ardiabe) and discovery (nyia kolatabe), the major arrangements are made between the man and the woman alone without recourse or subordination to a household head. These marriages illustrate the adaptation of marriage arrangements to the realities of Kanuri social life. Given the large population and the high divorce rate it is not possible or feasible for all weddings to function as mechanisms for strengthening and creating superior-subordinate relationships. And so this second variety of marriage arrangement operates because many women, especially as they grow older, are not willing to be pawns used for the purpose of defining relationships between men. By the same token, many are not willing to become obligated to others through marriage.

554 828 829 within this structure. The higher the status of an individual, the more arziyi he has, and the success of any one individual either in moving from one role to another, or in performing any given role also indicates the extent of his arziyi.

631 The Kanuri political system has been described in terms of the organization of power and authority in increasingly scaled social structures starting with the extended household organization and 621 ending with a discussion of modern political parties. Any local residence group in Bornu is potentially a larger political unit either in the form of a ward within a town or as a separate hamlet in the bush. This unit resembles an extended family organization but may include non-kin as well as kin members who are all subordinate in some way to the senior male of the residence association. We have used the term [602] extended household organization to describe this flexible unit. The relation of all subordinates to the senior member is similar to that between a father and his sons and non-kin as well as kin members 621 bring their wives to this unit at the local level. If the extended • 557 household organization head can maintain the subordination of his fol- [622] lowers, then he is on the way to becoming a "big" man. This can eventually lead to his attainment of the political position of Hamlet Head or Ward Head (Belama). This achieved status is then stabilized through inheritance.

621 571 At the local level, the extended household organization applies to a territorial unit of closely contiguous compounds each with its own head but with some form of subordination to the head of the larger unit. As we have seen, in other sections of the political organization and in the economic organization this kind of superior/subordinate relationship may be spread out to include men not living

4: Cohen E-5 (1956-1957) 1961
MS14 Kanuri MS14

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829 This triviality[1] is supported by traditional notions of cultural
779 and social change. It has often been said that Muslims are tied
to their traditional ways because of the fatalism inherent in
[114] their religious beliefs. Unfortunately this is an overgeneral-
ization that explains very little, and certainly not the course of
events described above. The Kanuri *are* Muslim, and they
often *do* make fatalistic statements. But, their fatalism always
concerns areas of total impotence as these are conceived of by
[369] the speaker. Thus rural peasants speak in a fatalistic way about
[665] the political organization of Bornu, although this is not the case
with many urban persons who belong to, or support, reform parties.
Or again, fatalism may be expressed over death, or knowledge
of God, or the origin of the world, or its future. Fatalism is
never referred to, however, for areas of behaviour that the in-
dividual construes to be susceptible to change by human efforts.
829 This is especially true of two closely related areas of social life,
• 557 (a) the economic sphere, and (b) social relations. The Kanuri
571 believe that it is possible and desirable to increase economic
status by one's own efforts. The preferred route to economic
betterment is not via technology, although this is important, but
by improving social relations. Thus to become a truck driver,
one needs workable relations with people who are drivers, so
that the status of apprentice may by achieved. That lorries are
a technological improvement over horses and donkeys is easily
[779] perceived and accepted. That is to say, the Kanuri are not
against change because as Muslims they accept the traditional
world as a manifestation of God's will. They do believe, how-
ever, that individual advancement is gained primarily through
profitable social relations, and only secondarily through tech-
nology.

241 It should also be noted in this respect that the Magumeri peas-
433 ants never at any time voice any dissatisfaction with the quantity
592 of their crop yields *using customary techniques*. Complaints are
heard but these always have to do with other aspects of farm
production more closely related to family and household organiz-
ation. Traditionally, and this is so today, crop yields are in-
creased through expanding one's acreage under cultivation. For
all peasants questioned this is accomplished through the expansion
of their household size, either by taking more wives, or client

[1] [i.e., that dictatorial powers were not invoked over the decision to use or not to use fertilizer, thus defining the whole matter as trivial and unimportant in the minds of the people. -- Analyst]